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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
EMPLOYMENT LAW
I. COURT BROADENS EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK LAW
In King v. PYA/Monarch, Inc.1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
revisited the South Carolina law governing employer-employee handbooks as
implied employment contracts. First, the court held that an unpublished policy
manual intended for use by supervisors may form an implied employment
contract if the employee is told of the manual's existence and is given oral
assurances of employment.2 Second, an employer may unilaterally modify an
implied employment contract if the affected employee receives actual notice
of the modification.3 Third, the court held that an employment contract was
subject to oral modification by the parties although the contract contained a
"no oral modification" clause.4
Merritt King was a sales representative at PYA until 1990, when he was
discharged for poor performance. At the start of his employment in 1983,
King received oral assurances of employment security and was required to sign
the company's published Rules and Regulations. This document allegedly
established a three-strike rule for employee termination.
The Rules and Regulations detailed a three-strike process that could be
used to terminate a PYA employee. This process required that any verbal or
written reprimand given to an employee be included in a personnel file of the
employee and that "an accumulation of three or more reprimands may be
considered cause for termination of employment." The Rules and Regulations
also indicated that disciplinary action would be taken in accordance with
company policy. The only established company policy contained in the record
was the "Branch Operating Manual" used by supervisors. This manual
emphasized the need for written records of employee disciplinary problems
and for such records to be placed in the employee's personnel file. The policy
manual provided a form to be used to notify employees when they received a
reprimand. The reprimand form contained four boxes, representing three
reprimands and final terminition.5
The trial court referred the case to a master-in-equity, who determined
that: (1) PYA's Rules and Regulations and the unpublished policy manual
could form the basis for an implied employment contract at the time of King's
hire; (2) the attempted 1989 modification of this employment contract was void
for lack of consideration and had been entered into under duress; (3) even if
1. _ S.C. _, 453 S.E.2d 885 (1995).
2. Id. at __,453 S.E.2d at 888.
3. Id. at , 453 S.E.2d at 888-89.
4. Id. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 887, 889.
5. Id. at __,453 S.E.2d at 886.
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the 1989 employment contract were valid, the written and oral actions of the
employer modified it by reinstituting the three-strike rule; and (4) PYA
breached its employment contract with King by failing to give him three
written warnings and by failing to place any warnings in his personnel file.6
King was awarded damages and severance pay. PYA appealed.
The supreme court first considered whether the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the company and the unpublished policy manual could create
an enforceable employment contract between King and PYA.7 The court,
applying the rule previously expressed in Small v. Springs Industries, Inc.,'
affirmed the trial court's holding that PYA had formed such a contract with
King when it voluntarily chose to "(1) publish the Rules and Regulations and
(2) orally assure King that their provisions would be followed in compliance
with the Manual .... I
The court's reasoning on this issue followed the unilateral contract
analysis appliecl in South Carolina and other jurisdictions."0 The typical
unilateral analysis provides that one party makes an offer, which invites
acceptance by the offeree solely by performance.11 When the offeree accepts
by performance, the offeror is then bound to perform.' Under this analysis,
the handbook constitutes the specific offer by the employer and the employee's
continued work provides the acceptance and consideration. The consideration
provided by the offeror is the benefit of having effective company policies and
regulations. 13  The court's use of this analytic framework comports with
Small and is consistent with other jurisdictions, 4 where it is well-settled that
6. PYA/Monarch, Inc., __ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 887.
7. Id. at_, 453 S.E.2d at 888.
8. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987). In Small the supreme court held that an employer
could alter the at-will status of the employee relationship through handbooks, bulletins, oral
assurances, and similar materials. See id. at 486, 357 S.E.2d at 455. The court also held that
the decision as to whether or not the doctrine is applicable to a handbook should be left to a jury.
Id.
9. PYA/Monarch, Inc., S.C. at , 453 S.E.2d at 888.
10. See Leahy v. Starflo Corp., __S.C., 431 S.E.2d 567 (1993); Miller v. Schmid Lab.,
Inc., 307 S.C. 140, 414 S.E.2d 126 (1992); Richard J. Pratt, Unilateral Modification of
Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments on the Employment-at-will Doctrine, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 197, 210 (1990). For a thorough review of case law on handbook employment
contract cases, see Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation, Right to Discharge Allegedly "At-Will"
Employee As Affected by Employer's Promulgation of Employment Policies as To Discharge, 33
A.L.R.4TH 120 (1984).
11. Pratt, supra note 10, at 210.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 210-11.
14. See Steven M. Wynkoop & Elizabeth S. Moise, Employee Handbooks in South Carolina:
The Employers'Dilemma, 42 S.C. L. REv. 323 (1991).
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an employee may be entitled to certain rights and privileges under the
provisions in an employee handbook.'"
PYA raised two arguments in opposition to the implied employment
contract: (1) the documents relied on by the respondent, including an
unpublished policy manual, published Rules and Regulations, and disputed
testimony of oral assurances were insufficient to form an employment contract,
and (2) the language used by the employer in the unpublished policy manual
was not specific or explicitly mandatory and could not create binding terms on
either party.16 The court rejected both arguments.
The court, citing Leahy v. Starflo Corp., 7 rejected PYA's first argument
because King was aware of the three-strike rule and the unpublished policy
manual.' 8  Once PYA committed itself to its three-strike rule by oral
assurances and written publication in the Rules and Regulations, it could not
deviate "from these assurances at its own pleasure." 9 The court refused to
let PYA escape liability under the guise that the policy manual was a mere
discretionary management tool not intended for King's reliance.w0
This line of reasoning is consistent with cases in other jurisdictions which
have held that the subjective intent of the offeror is not controlling. Under a
unilateral contract analysis, the existence and content of an offer is generally
determined by an objective test.21 Other courts have rejected the argument
that policies announced by employers may be ignored simply because such
policies are unpublished or of a discretionary nature. 2 The South Carolina
Supreme Court has joined these courts by rejecting PYA's argument that its
unpublished manual should be viewed as a supervisory tool, not an offer to
contract.
The court's reasoning could leave employers, large and small, scrambling
to protect themselves from the apparently expanding scope of the employee
handbook doctrine. The manual the court relied upon was never intended for
PYA's employees. Accordingly, the court's decision may have expanded the
handbook doctrine beyond the policy-driven beginnings of Small.
15. Id.; see Toussaintv. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). Toussaint
is generally recognized as the first case to consider the employee handbook as a unilateral
contract. Wynkoop & Moise, supra note 14.
16. Brief of Appellant at 21-33.
17. __ S.C. _, 431 S.E.2d 567 (1993).
18. PYAlMonarch, Inc., _ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 888.
19. Id. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 888.
20. Id. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 888.
21. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, (Minn. 1983). This often-cited
opinion found that "[w]hether a proposal is meant to be an offer for a unilateral contract is
determined by the outward manifestations of the parties, not by their subjective intentions." Id.
at 626; Wynkoop & Moise, supra note 14.
22. Pratt, supra note 10, at 211.
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The Small court focused on the employer's voluntary decision to publish
its handbook and bulletin.' The combination of voluntary publication and
oral assurances drove the court to hold that "the provisions of those publica-
tions... [raised] 'strong equitable and social policy reasons [for] militating
against allowing employers to promulgate for their employees potentially
misleading personnel manuals while reserving the right to deviate from them
at their own caprice.'" '24 The Small court cited liberally from cases that
emphasized the voluntary publication of rules as the offer to form a unilateral
contract, yet the King court declined to limit the implied employment contract
to published representations.35
In Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,26 a leading case on employee
handbooks, the Supreme Court of Minnesota recognized that there should be
a limit to the employee's rights under an implied employment contract.27
Under Pine River's reasoning, employees in King's position should not be able
to create employment contracts based on managers-only supervisory manuals.
The Pine River court indicated that an offer stemming from an employee
handbook must be definite and communicated to the employee to be valid.'
The objective manifestations of the parties clearly control and actual intent to
form a contract is not required. If a reasonable person would conclude that
an offer was intended, then the contract is valid.29 While King may have
subjectively believed that such a rule was in place, inquiry should have
focused on the reasonableness of his belief.
Although the policy manual was not distributed to employees, the court
was persuaded by King's testimony that he was told of its existence and that
the company followed the three-strike rule. The court held that a reasonable
person would have seen the unpublished manual as an offer to change the at-
will status."0 This expansive reading stretches objective manifestation beyond
23. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 485, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1989).
24. Id. (quoting Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 335 S.E.2d 79, 83 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985), cert. denied, 341 S.E.2d 39 (N.C. 1986)).
25. Id. (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 900 (Mich. 1980)
and Walker, 335 S.E.2d at 83).
26. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 626.
29. See id.; see also Thomas R. Haggard, Employment Handbooks- Still Evolving in South
Carolina Law, S.C. LAW., Sept./Oct. 1993 at 23, 24 (stating that, "[in other jurisdictions, the
courts have frequently held that this objective manifestation of intent is lacking if the handbook
was never distributed to the plaintiff or if the plaintiff was unaware of the term in question when
the alleged acceptance occurred").
30. PYA/Monarch, Inc., - S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 888.
1995]
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the limits recognized by other jurisdictions3' and moves the court toward an
analysis that is subjective in nature.
The court also dismissed PYA's argument that the manual's language was
purely discretionary and not enforceable. 2 In Small the court indicated that
if an employer wishes to issue policies, manuals or bulletins as purely advisory
statements while continuing an employment-at-will status, the employer is free
to do so.33 Despite this language, the King court dismissed petitioner's
arguments, creating real questions for employers and their counsel.
The three-strike rule in the Rules and Regulations included specific
discretionary language. The rules provided that at the discretion of the
supervisor, warnings may be issued by managers. Additionally, they provided
that "one serious violation of a Company rule, or an accumulation of three or
more reprimands may be considered cause for termination of employment."
34
Although the language might be viewed as ambiguous, the court placed little
emphasis on this discretionary language.35
Despite the discretionary language in the rules, the court focused on
mandatory language found in the unpublished policy manual. The court's
reliance on this language is questionable because the cited mandatory language
refers to the policy manual in general, not the specific rules and regula-
tions.3 6 Some of the manual's policies may have been mandatory, but the
provisions concerning termination were apparently intended as supervisory
guidance. The employer couched the three-strike rule in discretionary terms
and likely never meant the rule to be mandatory on the supervisor or the
employee. Thus, the court's application of mandatory policy manual language
to the three-strike system may have been misplaced.37
Courts in several other states have adopted a more moderate position than
that of South Carolina and require explicit, mandatory language to fulfill the
requirement of a firm offer." In Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth
31. See Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 117 N.W.2d 213, 222 (Minn. 1962) (holding that a
control copy of the personnel policy that contained a just-cause provision was not binding on the
employer because the employee version of the personnel policy did not include the same just-
cause provision, which was ruled to be merely a policy guide for supervisors); see also Spero v.
Lockwood, Inc., 721 P.2d 174, 175 (Idaho 1986) (refusing to apply a policy manual against an
employer when the contents of the manual were never communicated to the employee and the
evidence adduced that the employee never read or relied on the terms of the manual).
32. PYA/Monarch, Inc., S.C. at , 453 S.E.2d at 888.
33. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 486, 484, 357 S.E.2d 451, 455 (1987).
34. Brief of Appellant at 25.
35. PYA/Monarch, Inc., _ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 885.
36. Id. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 888.
37. Brief of Appellant at 22-25.
38. See Gaines v. Wilmington Trust Co., No. CIV.A. 90C-MR-135, 1991 WL 113613 (Del.
Super. Ct. June 3, 1991); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314 (il.
1987); Yow v. Alexander County Dep't of Social Servs. 319 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert.
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Hospital Center9 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the narrow approach
by requiring a firm offer in specific, mandatory language from the employer.
The manual at issue in Duldulao contained contractually binding language that
clearly stated that "permanent employees" are never dismissed without prior
written admonitions, and "'that three warning notices are required before an
employee is dismissed.'"40 In Frank v. South Suburban Hospital Founda-
tion4' the Appellate Court of Illinois applied this standard to language
strikingly similar to that at issue in PYA/Monarch. The court read the
language concerning discipline procedures as discretionary because the policies
at issue described conduct that "may subject" an employee to discipline.42
The handbook could not constitute a contractual offer because there was "no
promise to follow a course of progressive discipline in every situation prior to
termination. "'
The Illinois courts have held that an employment handbook that creates
a progressive and immediate termination right in the employer cannot establish
a contractually-enforceable right and alter an employee's at-will status.' The
position taken in Illinois is that handbooks that allow termination on the first
serious infraction do not constitute a binding promise to always use progres-
sive discipline and, thus, do not successfully alter the relationship. 45 PYA's
manual fits within this framework.46
Courts in North Carolina and Delaware also give greater effect to
discretionary terms than South Carolina. In Yow v. Alexander County
Department of Social Services47 the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected
an employee's claim that handbook warnings created an enforceable contract
right. The court held, "the warning sequence is discretionary. 'An employ-
ee... may be warned, reprimanded, suspended or dismissed... The degree
and kind of action to be taken will be based upon the [supervisor's] sound and
considered judgement .... 48 In Gaines v. Wilmington Trust Compay 49
denied, 323 S.E.2d 927 (N.C. 1984).
39. 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987) (setting out a three-part test requiring the language of a
policy statement by an employer contain a promise clear enough that an employee would
reasonably believe that an offer had been made).
40. Id. at 318.
41. 628 N.E.2d 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
42. Id. at 957.
43. Id.
44. Shepley v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 722 F. Supp. 506 (D. Ill. 1989); Semerau
v. Schiller Park, 569 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. 1991).
45. Frank, 628 N.E.2d at 958.
46. The manual stated: "[a]t the discretion of the warehouse managers, one serious violation
of Company rule, or an accumulation of three or more reprimands may be considered cause for
termination of employment." See Brief of Appellant at 25.
47. 319 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 323 S.E.2d 927 (N.C. 1984).
48. Id. at 631 (quoting the employee handbook and citing Sumler v. City of Winston-Salem,
1995]
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the Delaware Superior Court applied the well-settled Delaware rule that an
employee handbook will not alter the at-will status of the employee "unless
there is clear language placing express limits on the employer's right to
discharge."5" According to the Delaware courts, requiring clear, mandatory
language is an effective means of balancing the competing needs of the
employer and the employee."
The South Carolina Supreme Court next considered whether PYA
successfully modified the implied employment contract by a 1989 employment
agreement signed by King purporting to reestablish his at-will status. In 1989
King and other sales representatives were asked to sign an agreement that
created a new commission schedule and established that commission sales
representatives were to be at-will employees. The agreement, allegedly signed
under duress and without additional consideration, provided for no oral
modifications once the agreement was executed. 2
The court indicated that the employer's actions operated as a unilateral
modification of an employment contract by a subsequent handbook, similar to
the situation in Fleming v. Borden, Inc.53 King argued that the modification
of the 1983 employment contract by the 1989 contract was ineffectual based
on traditional "mutuality of obligation" contract principles.' The court
dismissed this bilateral contract approach in favor of the unilateral analysis it
applied in Fleming and ruled in favor of PYA on this issue."5
In Fleming the court considered how an implied employment contract
based on handbooks may be modified. To be effective under the Small
unilateral contract approach, the court determined that an employer is free to
unilaterally modify the contract if the employee receives actual notice of the
intended modification. 6 The PYA/Monarch court then determined that the
1989 contract was the equivalent of a subsequent handbook modification, and
because King had notice when he signed the "contract," it effectively
eliminated the implied employment contract of 1983.11
448 F. Supp. 519, 529 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (holding that the word "may" implies discretionary
action)); see also Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 335 S.E.2d 79, 83-84 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that the policies in the manual and the rules of conduct were not all-inclusive and
that the described employee conduct "may result" in the listed disciplinary procedures), cert.
denied, 341 S.E.2d 39 (N.C. 1986).
49. No. CIV.A. 90C-MR-135, 1991 WL 113613 (Del. Super. Ct. June 3, 1991).
50. Id. at *2 (citing Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982)).
51. Id.
52. PYA/Monarch, Inc., _ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 887.
53. _ S.C. _, 450 S.E.2d 589 (1994).
54. Brief of Respondent at 20-21.
55. See PYA/Monarch, Inc., - S.C. at __, 453 S.E.2d at 888-89.
56. Fleming, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 595-96.
57. PYA/Monarch, Inc., _ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 888-89.
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Many courts have recognized the need to allow employers the concession
that once bound by the handbook, they are free to unilaterally modify the
agreement with a subsequent handbook." These courts have reasoned that
if an employer's handbook may unilaterally bind the employer, they may
unilaterally modify that same relationship under the same contract principles
that created the relationship.59
Scholars have also argued that business and economic policy require that
employers be able to control contractual liabilities.Y0 As one commentator
explained, "To hold that handbooks contain immutable rights would mean that
policies 'could never be changed short of successful renegotiations with each
employee who worked while the policy was in effect.'" 61  The Fleming
doctrine, by providing such protection for employers, places South Carolina
among those states willing to recognize the right of the employer to unilateral-
ly modify the contract. This position is also logically consistent with its
unilateral contract approach to handbook law.62 However, to protect its
position, the employer must ensure that the employee receives actual notice.
The court made clear that as long as the employer can ensure that the
employee read and understood the modification, the employer should remain
protected until it does something further to alter the contract.63  This
employer protection is limited, however, because the issue is one of fact for
the jury and the burden is on the employer to show actual notice.'
Finally, the court held that a "no oral modification clause" inserted in the
1989 employment agreement was ineffective as a means of preventing oral
modification.' In May of 1990, a PYA supervisor gave King a "First
Warning" on a form from the unpublished policy manual. Contemporaneous-
ly, King was orally assured that this was the first of three warnings he would
receive prior to termination.' Because of those events, the supreme court
affirmed the Master's ruling that PYA modified the 1989 employment
agreement through their acts and oral assurances.
58. Pratt, supra note 10, at 218-19.
59. Id. at 218.
60. Id. at 219.
61. Id. (citing Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 119 (Mich. 1989)).
62. See Pratt, supra note 10, at 213 & n.128; Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 815
P.2d 1362, 1367 (Wash. 1991); see also Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 120 (holding that an employer's
unilateral change in policy will not be effective until affected employees receive reasonable notice
of the change).
63. See Fleming v. Borden, Inc., _ S.C. _, _, 450 S.E.2d 589, 595-96 (1994);
Haggard, supra note 29, at 24.
64. Fleming, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 595-96. For a discussion of arguments against
allowing the employer a right to unilaterally modify the employment contract based on traditional
contract principles, see Pratt, supra note 10, at 219-24.
65. PYA/Monarch, Inc., __ S.C. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 889.
66.. Id. at _, 453 S.E.2d at 889.
1995]
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In reaching its conclusion, the court applied, for the first time in an
employment contract setting, the general rule that "a written contract may be
modified by oral agreement even when the contract expressly states all changes
must be in writing."67 The court reasoned that because conditions in an
employment contract can be waived, it was proper to apply the general rule
that "no oral modification" clauses can be orally waived to an employment
context.68 Employment conditions had been legitimately waived by employ-
ers in employment contracts by (1) their actions,69 (2) entering an agreement
with a union, 70 and (3) establishing a sexual harassment policy.
71
The general rule espoused by the court is consistent with jurisdictions that
allow oral modifications of integrated employment contracts, and with the
pro-employee approach that the court has taken in other employee handbook
cases. However, this rule raises issues for employers and their attorneys in
the context of oral modifications to written, fully integrated employment
contracts. Other courts have refused to expand the doctrine by holding
attempts at oral modification ineffective.73 Economically, the latter position
may be better because it allows employers to control contractual liabilities.
If any company supervisor can modify a clear, unequivocal contract or
handbook disclaiming the contractual relationship, the employer will have to
expend additional resources to train its managers in the intricacies of oral
modification and waiver. This added cost burden will likely continue to put
pressure on employers already in the state and curtail economic development
efforts to attract new industry to this state. 74
The effect King will have on future wrongful termination cases remains
to be seen. However, by arguably taking an expansive view of the scope of
the employee handbook doctrine, the court may have further encroached on
an employer's ability to discharge allegedly "at will" employees.
D. Jay Davis, Jr.
67. Id. at , 453 S.E.2d at 889.
68. Id. at , 453 S.E.2d at 889.
69. Leahy v. Starflo Corp., _ S.C. __, , 431 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1993).
70. Johnson v. American Ry. Express Co., 163 S.C. 191, 161 S.E. 473 (1931).
71. Bookman v. Shakespeare Co., _S.C. _, 442 S.E.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1994), cert.
denied, (July 14, 1994).
72. See Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys., Inc., 549 N.E.2d 1210, 1217 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); cf.
Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 766 P.2d 768, 771 (Idaho 1988) (holding that subjective beliefs
by an employee that he could not be fired except for cause were directly contrary to written terms
and did not provide adequate foundation for oral modification of an earlier written contract).
73. See Goodyear Publishing Co. v. Mundell, 427 N.Y.S.2d 242,243 (App. Div. 1980); see
also Eluschuk v. Chemical Eng'rs Termite Control, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 711,715 (Ct. App. 1966)
(allowing oral modifications of written, fully integrated contracts when there is execution of the
modification).
74. See Haggard, supra note 29, at 28.
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II. PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SATURDAY
WORSHIPPERS DOES NOT APPLY TO TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS
The South Carolina Supreme Court held in Holley v. Mount Vernon Mills,
Inc.' that sections 53-1-1102 and 53-1-150' of the South Carolina Code do
not prohibit a textile manufacturer from discriminating against persons who
worship on Saturday. Because neither party raised the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the statutes, the court expressed no opinion on whether these
Sunday Blue Laws violate the Establishment Clause of the federal and South
Carolina constitutions and resolved the case as a simple matter of statutory
interpretation.4
Plaintiff Jimmy Holley (Holley) was employed by Defendant Mount
Vernon Mills, Inc. (Mount Vernon), a textile plant which operates seven days
a week using a rotation method for selecting employees to work weekends.
In 1989, Holley converted to the Seventh-Day Adventist faith, which has a
Saturday Sabbath. Consequently, Holley refused to work on his scheduled
Saturday rotations. After several months of unexcused Saturday absences,
Mount Vernon terminated Holley's employment.5
Holley brought an action against Mount Vernon, alleging that section
53-1-1506 of the South Carolina Code prohibits, inter alia, employers from
discriminating against people who worship on Saturday. Mount Vernon
claimed it was exempt from section 53-1-150 pursuant to section 53-1-110,1
1. _ S.C. _, 440 S.E.2d 373 (1994).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-110 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (exempting the manufactureand finishing
of textile products from compliance with Sunday Blue Laws).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-150 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (prohibiting, inter alia, discrimination
against persons who worship on Saturday).
4. Holley, - S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 374-75.
5. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 374.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-150(c) (Law. Co-op. 1992). This section provides:
Any employee of any business which operates on Sunday under the provisions of this
section has the option of refusing to work in accordance with provisions of § 53-1-
100 of the 1976 Code. Any employer who dismisses or demotes an employee
because he is a conscientious objector to Sunday work is subject to a civil penalty of
triple the damages found .... No proprietorof a retail establishmentwho is opposed
to working on Sunday may be forced by his lessor or franchisor to open his
establishment on Sunday nor may there be discrimination against persons whose
regular day of worship is Saturday.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-110 (Law. Co-op. 1992). This section provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the manufacture and finishing of textile
products shall be exempt from the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 53, as amended.
Provided, however, that no person shall be required to work on Sunday who is
conscientiously opposed to Sunday work. If any person refuses to work on Sunday
because of conscientious or physical objections, he shall not jeopardize his seniority
10
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which exempts certain textile plants from the provisions of Chapter 1, Title
53. The trial judge granted Mount Vernon's motion for summary judgment,
finding that Mount Vernon was exempt from section 53-1-150 and, further-
more, that section 53-1-110 does not prohibit discrimination against persons
who worship on Saturday. Holley appealed.8
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court was presented with a
narrow question of statutory interpretation. Holley contended that sections
53-1-150 and 53-1-110 should be read together as prohibiting Mount Vernon
from discriminating against employees who worship on Saturday.9 Holley
conceded that the plain meaning of each- section was easy to determine if read
alone." However, Holley contended that an ambiguity arises when the
sections are read together. Holley further argued that because section
53-1-150, prohibiting discrimination against persons who worship on Saturday,
was enacted after section 53-1-110 and is located after section 53-1-110 in the
code, section 53-1-150 should control."
In rejecting Holley's argument, the court held that section 53-1-110
clearly and unambiguously exempts textile manufacturers and finishers, such
as Mount Vernon, from all provisions of Chapter 1 of Title 53.2 Conse-
quently, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling that section
53-1-150 did not prohibit Mount Vernon from disciminating against
employees such as Holley who worship on Saturday. In addition, the court
affirmed that section 53-1-110 does not prohibit textile plants from discriminat-
ing against a person who worships on Saturday because no language in that
section specifically addresses people who worship on Saturday. 3
While the Holley opinion does not reach constitutional issues, it is
interesting to speculate on the possible consequences that may have arisen had
the parties chosen to raise such issues. 4 The United States Supreme Court
has determined that a statute violates the Establishment Clause if its primary
rights by such refusal or be discriminated against in any manner.
Id.
8. Holley, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 374.
9. Id. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 374.
10. Brief of Appellant at 6.
11. Id. (citing Feldman v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 203 S.C. 49, 54, 26 S.E.2d 22, 24
(1943) for the proposition that when there is a clearly irreconcilable conflict in provisions of a
statute, "the last in time or order of arrangement prevails").
12. Holley, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 374-75 (citing Medlock v. 1985 Ford F-150 Pick
Up, 308 S.C. 68, 417 S.E.2d 85 (1992), for the rule of statutory interpretation that when a
statute is clear and unambiguous, its terms must be given their literal meaning).
13. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 374. Those who worship on Sunday are provided with an
exception. Id. at, 440 S.E.2d at 374; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-110 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
14. The supreme court did order the parties to file supplemental briefs, and ordered the Office
of the Attorney General to file an amicus brief, on the issue of whether the Sunday Blue Laws
violate the Establishment Clause of the federal or state constitutions.
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effect is to promote or support a religion or if it fosters excessive governmen-
tal entanglement with religion.'5 By protecting individuals from working on
Saturday because it is their "day of worship," section 53-1-150(c) arguably
promotes and advances a religion that observes its Sabbath on Saturday.' 6
This open question notwithstanding, Holley v. Vernon Mills, Inc. makes clear
that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, textile manufacturers may fire an
employee because of that employee's religious opposition to working on
Saturdays.
Mary L. Hughes
15. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1970), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
16. Supplemental Brief of Respondent at 10-15; see also Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, 472
U.S. 703 (1983) (holding that a Connecticut statute which provided Sabbath observers with an
absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath violated the Establishment Clause); cf.
Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dep't Store, 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1962); Opinion of the Justices, 229
A.2d 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (both upholding exemptions for Saturday Sabbath observers).
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